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Kaufman: Employment Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN TIE SUPREME COURT
Leon Lazer:
Our next speaker on the rather important case involving
employment discrimination is one of the leading professors here
at Touro and her interest in not only employment discrimination
but in other discrimination has resulted in her being well
recognized. She has lectured at the various seminars conducted
for the education and training of judges and, of course, she is a
regular at these conferences of ours. So I want to introduce to
you now to deal with employment discrimination our own Eileen
Kaufman.
Eileen Kaufman: *
Thank you, Leon. I am going to be talking actually about two
employment discrimination cases, one having to do with the use
of after-acquired evidence of misconduct and the other that arises
in a tax context. That case is Conmissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Schleier.1 Although it is not included in your material, it is a
very important case dealing with the taxability of awards under
discrimination statutes.
For those of you who were here last year, I think you may
remember a case that we previewed rather extensively at that
2
time, and that is McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
That was the major employment discrimination case of the term,
and it dealt with the issue of after-acquired evidence. More
specifically, the issue in the case was whether an employee's
claim of discriminatory discharge is barred when, after that
discriminatory discharge, the employer discovers evidence that
would have warranted the discharge of the employee for
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.

B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975; L.L.M..
New York University, 1992.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
2. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
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Christine McKennon worked for the same company for
approximately thirty years. When she turned sixty-two, she was
discharged, and she suspected that the termination was based on
age. She thereupon brought an action in federal court under the
3
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, hereafter ADEA,
seeking backpay as well as reinstatement. However, while her
case was pending, in fact, during her deposition, the employer
discovered that before she was terminated, she had copied certain
confidential documents regarding the company's financial
condition. She explained that she did that because she feared that
she was about to be fired based on her age, so she copied the
documents as "insurance" or "protection." '4 Upon learning of
that conduct, the employer promptly sent her a letter again
terminating her employment based on this misconduct. 5 Two key
facts were not in dispute by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court: first, that McKennon's discharge was actually
based on unlawful age discrimination: and, second, that the act of
copying the confidential documents would have warranted and
actually resulted in her discharge had it been known earlier.
In a unanimous decision, somewhat surprising given the split in
the circuits on this issue, the Supreme Court held that afteracquired evidence of misconduct does not bar the discrimination
claim. 6 The Court explained that any contrary result would
undermine the purpose of discrimination statutes, namely to
provide compensation to victims of discrimination and to deter
acts of discrimination. In other words, the remedial scheme of
antidiscrimination statutes would be undermined if after-acquired

3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634) [hereafter ADEA].

Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
4. McKennon, 115 S.Ct. at 883.

5.Id.
at 884.
6. Id.
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evidence of wrongdoing operated to preclude discrimination
7
claims.
However, that does not mean that after-acquired evidence has
no role to play. It does indeed have a role to play when it comes
to the specific remedy to be ordered. While the Court declined to
fashion a bright line rule to be applied in every case, the Court
did provide some general guidelines. As a general proposition,
reinstatement and front pay are inappropriate because those
remedies would unduly interfere with the legitimate interest that
employers have in not having to rehire someone who had
committed the kind of misconduct that warranted dismissal. 8 On
the other hand, backpay is an appropriate remedy, at least from
the date of the unlawful discharge to the date that the employer
discovered the evidence of the misconduct. 9 While offering these
as general guidelines, the Court also indicated that the lower
courts should consider what the Court called "extraordinary
equitable circumstances" in fashioning the appropriate scope of
relief in the particular case. 10
It should be clear that McKennon places the burden on the
employer in the first instance to demonstrate that the misconduct
was so severe that (a) it would have warranted dismissal, and (b)
it would actually have resulted in dismissal. 1 1 However, the
Court did not impose an additional burden on employers to
demonstrate that, absent the discrimination lawsuit, it actually
would have discovered this evidence. McKennon had argued in
her brief to the Supreme Court that the Court should impose this
7. Id. at 886. "Congress designed the remedial measures... to serve as

a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers to 'self-examine and to self-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges' of discrimination." Id. at 884. The Court found that "lain
absolute rule barring any recovery ... would undermine the ADEA's
objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations, and
of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from age
discrimination." Id.

8. Id. "It would be both inequitable and pointless to order reinstatement
of someone the employer would have terminated. .

. ."

Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
l1. Id.
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as an additional element of proof because of the potential for
abuse.12 Remember how the evidence was discovered in
McKennon; it was discovered during discovery in the
discrimination suit. In fact, that is typically how the evidence of
misconduct is acquired. 13 We talked a little bit last year at this
conference about the fact that employers were becoming
increasingly aggressive in seeking out, through discovery,
evidence of misconduct so that they could minimize potential
liability. The McKennon Court acknowledged that potential for
abuse, 14 but indicated that the availability of fee shifting and the
availability of sanctions under Rule 1115 would operate as
sufficient safeguards against that type of abuse. 16
While McKennon is an age discrimination claim, there is little
doubt that the decision is equally applicable to other federal
antidiscrimination statutes. The Court specifically located the
ADEA within the wider antidiscrimination statutory scheme. 17
Thus, not surprisingly, the McKennon ruling has been applied to
Title VII cases and to claims arising under § 1981 and § 1983.18
12. Brief for Petitioner at pointheading III, McKennon v. Banner Nashville
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995) (No. 93-1543).
13. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (1992). In
Wallace, the employer learned during the employee's deposition in the
litigation that the employee had pled guilty to "possession of cocaine and
marijuana prior to her filing her application for employment" upon which she
indicated she had never been convicted of a crime. Id. at 1176-77. See also
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
14. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. 886. See also Eileen Kaufman, Recent
Developments in the Supreme Court: Employment Discrimination, 11 ToURO
L. REV. 465, 479 (1995).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
16. McKennon, 115 S.Ct. at 886.
17. Id. at 884. The Supreme Court noted that "[tihe ADEA and Title VII
share common substantive features and also a common purpose: 'the
elimination of discrimination in the workplace."' Id. (citation omitted).
18. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995). The
court relied upon the reasoning in McKennon, which "made clear that its
analysis applied not only to claims under the ADEA, but to those under Title
VII as well." Id. at 1238; Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072,
1973 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the court was bound by McKennon in a Title
VII action); Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak House, Inc., 49 F.2d 1150, 1153
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One interesting issue that has arisen post-McKennon is how to

handle cases involving misconduct at the time of the initial
hiring. Those cases tend to be resume fraud cases and
misstatements on employment applications, particularly,

misstatements about whether or not the applicant has a college
degree. 19 The question under McKennon is whether the employer
should have to prove that it would have fired the employee upon
learning of the resume fraud or whether it would suffice for the
employer to say and prove that it would not have hired the
employee had it known of the resume fraud.
The Fifth Circuit recently concluded that the standard is
"whether the employee would have been fired upon discovery of
the wrongdoing, not whether he would have been hired in the
first instance." 20 The court explained, "Merely asking whether
the employee would have been hired fails to recognize that an
employer may retain an individual who has performed
successfully despite lack of formal qualification." 2 1 However,
there are some other decisions that apparently would preclude
reinstatement and front pay upon a finding either that the
(6th Cir. 1995) (stating that "we are persuaded by [McKennon's] language that
it applies equally to a Title VII claim"); Roberson v. Mullins, 876 F. Supp.
100 (W.D. Va. 1995) (applying McKennon to a § 1983 claim); McCray v.
DPC Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (applying McKennon to
a § 1981 claim).
19. See, e.g., Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.
1995) (during discovery the employer learned that there were false
representations made on the employee's resume regarding her work
experience); Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995),
infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir.). In
Shattuck, the employee brought an action for unlawful discharge under the
ADEA. Just prior to the commencement of the trial, the employer discovered
that the employee "falsely represented on his employment application that he
was a college graduate when in fact he had completed less than a year of
college work." Id. The employer argued that they never would have hired him
if they knew from the beginning that he was not a college graduate, and
"would have fired him upon its discovery." Id. The court held that the
employer "cannot obtain the relief it seeks solely on account of its afteracquired evidence." Id.
21. Id at 1109.
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employee would have been fired or that he or she would not have
22
initially been hired.
A slight variation of this issue that has been raised postMcKennon is whether the McKennon doctrine applies to cases
where the misconduct occurs after discharge. At least one court
has held that McKennon is not applicable to that type of fact
23
pattern.

Finally. let me briefly make a few practical points about
litigation post-McKennon. First, the McKennon doctrine has
resulted in the fairly routine denial of motions for summary

judgment. 2 4 I think that reflects the fact that under McKennon,
there is likely to be a factual question concerning whether the
22. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1073 (3d Cir.
1995) (misrepresentations on employee's resume and job application regarding
background information such as professional experience and educational
degrees); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (11th Cir.
1992) (misrepresentation on job application that employee had never been
convicted of a crime). In Wallace, the court stated that reinstatement and front
pay would go beyond making the employee "whole" and would "unduly" limit
an employer's freedom to discharge unqualified and/or untrustworthy
employees. Id. at 1182. See also Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel and Casino,
828 F. Supp. 314, 317 (D. N.J. 1993) (misrepresentation on employee's job
application that he left his prior employment "for personal reasons when in
fact he was forced to resign because of a sexual harassment claim"). The court
in Massey held that after-acquired evidence which demonstrates that the
employer would have terminated the employee anyway will bar remedies such
as front-pay and reinstatement, but that such evidence will not preclude
employee seeking alternative remedies such as backpay. Id. at 324.
23. See Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Center, 905 F.
Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995). Carr involved an employee's post-employment
use of marijuana. The employer cited this practice as grounds for her
termination after such information was acquired. Id. at 621. The court held,
however, that such after-acquired evidence was not admissible because there
was no proof that the employee used controlled substances during her
employment nor was there any reason to believe that she would have used
drugs had her employment continued. Id. at 628-29. Moreover, in support of
its finding that McKennon was not applicable under these facts, the court stated
that
"[c]ounty
policies
governing
employment
simply
cannot
properly .... either legally or equitably, be imposed upon a person after his
or her employment has terminated. Id. at 629.
24. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995);
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995).
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employer would have fired the employee for this type of
misconduct. Given the factual issues and given the fact that
equitable considerations now have a role to play in fashioning the
relief, summary judgment is likely to be inappropriate. The
second practical point that I would like to make is that, given
McKennon, bifurcation of the discrimination claim may be
sensible, because under McKennon, the evidence of misconduct
has no relevance to the liability phase of the case. It is only
relevant with respect to the relief that is ordered, and so it may
be appropriate to bifurcate the trial so as not to let evidence of
the misconduct be improperly used in the liability phase.
The second employment discrimination case decided last term
is the tax case that I mentioned, Conunissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Schleier.2 5 The issue in that case was whether an
award under the ADEA constitutes taxable income. 26 I do not
claim to be a tax expert, but I think I can explain this case
relatively simply. Let me provide just a little bit of background.
First, the Internal Revenue Code very broadly defines gross
"...-27
income as "all income from whatever source derived .
However, § 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of
any damages received on account of personal injuries or
sickness. 28 Therefore, the issue in Schleier turns on whether an
award under the ADEA constitutes damages on account of
personal injuries. 29
The other piece of background that I think is essential is the
1992 decision of United States v. Burke30 because, there, the
Court concluded that an award of backpay under Title VII, the
pre-1991 version of Title VII, was not excludable from gross

25. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
26. Id. at 2161.
27. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1994).

28. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1994). Section 104(a)(2) provides in
pertinent part that "gross income does not include... the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or
as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness[.]"
29. Schleier, 115 S.Ct. at 2162.
30. 504 U.S. 229.
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income. 3 1 That decision rested on the fact that Title VII, prior to
1991, afforded very limited relief -- no compensatory damages,
no punitive damages, and no jury trial; rather, only backpay and
reinstatement were available. 32 The Court in Burke relied on a
regulation of the Treasury Department that interpreted the
Internal Revenue Code to exempt only those damages awarded in
a tort-type action and, given the limited remedies available under
Title VII at the time, the Court had little trouble concluding that
33
Title VII could not be considered tort-like.
That brings us to Schleier, which raises the identical issue but
in the context of an age discrimination claim. 34 The ADEA
prohibits discrimination in employment based on age, and
provides legal and equitable relief, reinstatement, hiring, and
promotion, as well as awards for backpay and an equal award for
liquidated damages if the conduct is determined to be willful. 35 It
also provides a right to a jury trial, but it does not authorize
compensatory relief in the form of pain and suffering or
emotional distress damages.36
The taxpayer in Schleier received an award of approximately
$145,000 by way of settlement. Half of that was allocated to
backpay and half was allocated to liquidated damages. The
taxpayer initially included only the backpay in his gross
income. 37 He excluded the liquidated damages portion of the
award, but he subsequently filed for a refund, arguing that the
entire award under the ADEA should be excludable from gross
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 242.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 241.
Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2161.
Id. at 2162. See supra note 3.
Id. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th

Cir. 1979) (reasoning that the purpose of the ADEA is to prevent
discrimination on the basis of age and, thus, that the absence of a provision for
compensatory damages for pain and suffering within the statute is dispositive
of the legislative intent that such remedies are not appropriate); see also
Phuong v. National Academy of Sciences, 901 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(providing that a terminated employee has the right to a jury trial when
violations of the ADEA are claimed against a private corporation).
37. Id. at 2162.
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income. 38 The Tax Court agreed, as did the Fifth Circuit. 39 In a
six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
no portion of the ADEA award is excludable from gross income
40
because the award is not on an account of personal injuries.
To explain its conclusion, although this explanation leaves me a
little confused, the Court compared an ADEA claim to a typical
automobile accident recovery. 4 1 The Court said in the car
accident case, the victim "suffers (a) medical expenses, (b) lost
wages, and (c) pain, suffering and emotional distress," and all of
those damages are excludable from gross income because each
and every element of that award satisfies the statutory
requirement that the damages be received "on account of
personal injuries." 42
In sharp contrast, the Court stated that the ADEA award is not
an award on account of personal injury or sickness even though
the lost wages that are suffered by the ADEA plaintiff might look
43
very much like the lost wages of the car accident victim. The
Court acknowledged that an unlawful termination may cause
some psychological or emotional injuries that are similar to the
intangible injuries suffered by an automobile accident victim, but
the Court concluded that the recovery of back wages is simply
not attributable to that injury. 44 It is the absence of causation
between the personal injury and the lost wages that is dispositive
to the majority. The Court explained
thus, in our automobile hypothetical, the accident causes a
personal injury which in turn causes a loss of wages. In age
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2162-63. See Schleier v. Commissioner, 1993 WVL 767976 (U.S.

Tax Ct. 1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159

(1995).
40. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer joined.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Souter joined
with respect to Part II. Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 2163-64.
Id.
Id. at 2164.
Id. at 2163-64.
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discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury
and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount
of back wages recovered is completely independent of the
45
existence or extent of any personal injury.
If you are having trouble distinguishing the car accident case
from the age discrimination case, you are in good company. In a
very sharply worded dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the
majority for seemingly backing off from its earlier
pronouncement that discriminatory treatment does inflict a
personal injury and that the damages received on account of that
are received on account of personal injury within the meaning of
46
the Internal Revenue Code.
However, getting back to the majority opinion, in addition to
finding that backpay is not excludable from gross income, the
Court also held that liquidated damages are not excludable from
gross income. 47 The Court rejected the argument advanced by
the plaintiff that liquidated damages are meant to be
compensatory, that they are meant to compensate for trivial sorts
of damages that are hard to quantify. 4 8 The Court relied on a
1985 decision, Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,49 where the
Court had characterized liquidated damages under the ADEA as
punitive in nature and given that, like back wages, liquidated
damages are not received on account of personal injury, and,
50
therefore are not excludable from gross income.
I think the most significant part of the Schleier decision is the
Court's rejection of the argument based on the Treasury
regulation which interprets § 104(a)(2) of the Code to apply to
damages received "through prosecution of a legal suit or action
based upon tort or tort type rights .

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 2167-69.
Id. at 2164-65.
Id. at 2615.
469 U.S. 111,

. . .

51 That was the analysis

125 (stating that "Congress intended for liquidated

damages to be punitive in nature").
50. Id. at 125.

51. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1994); Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
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of United States v. Burke,52 where the Court looked at the
statute, Title VII, and said, "Is this a tort type action? Does Title
VII create a scheme that appears to be tort-like?" There, the
53
Court said no.
In Schleier, the Court rejected the argument that the ADEA is
tort-like. 54 That is surprising because in Burke, what the Court
focused on were two characteristics of tort-like actions: (1) The
availability of punitive damages, and (2) the availability of a jury
trial. Both were present under the ADEA. The Schleier Court
says that is not sufficient. The real hallmark of a tort-like action
is the availability of full compensatory relief, compensation for
things like pain and suffering and emotional distress. In the
absence of that, we do not have a tort-like action. 55 The second
basis for rejecting the taxpayer's regulatory argument, and this is
the one I think will have the most impact on subsequent cases,
was the Court's conclusion that the treasury regulations cannot
stand as a substitute for the statutory requirement. 5 6 The
Treasury Department cannot issue a regulation that says that so
long as the damages are recovered in a tort-like action, they are
excludable from gross income because the Internal Revenue Code
itself says, and requires, that the damages must be received on
account of personal injuries. 57
Therefore, the upshot of Schleier is that in order for damages
to be excludable, the awards must satisfy two independent
requirements: (1) It must have been received through litigation of
a tort-type action, and, (2) it still must be on account of personal
injuries. 58 I think that raises a whole host of very interesting
52. 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992). "In order to come within the § 104(a)(2)

income exclusion, [the taxpayer] must show that Title VII, the legal basis for
their recovery of backpay, redresses a tort-like personal injury in accord with
[the statutory language limiting the exclusion to cases involving physical injury
or sickness]." Id.
53. Id. at 237-41.
54. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
55. Id. at 2167.
56. Id.
57. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
58. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166.
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questions. First and foremost, of course, is its effect on Title VII
now that Title VII has been amended. Title VII now provides the
right for a jury trial, and provides for compensatory and punitive
damages. 59 Under United States v. Burke, I think that most of us
thought that damages under Title VII as amended would now be
excludable. However, Schleier clearly indicates that establishing
the cause of action as tort-like is not sufficient. 60 The taxpayer
has to additionally demonstrate that the recovery is on account of
personal injury or sickness, 6 1 and if age discrimination does not
qualify, it is very hard to imagine that race or sex discrimination
would. I suspect that damages awarded under Title VIII, the Fair
Housing Act, would fare no better.
The results under § 1983. I think, are a little more
complicated. I suspect that the decision in Schleier calls into
question several § 1983 reported decisions, decisions which held
62
that § 1983 damages were excludable from gross income.
However, I think that the result depends on the basis of the
§ 1983 claim being asserted. If you have a § 1983 claim
involving a discharge on First Amendment grounds, I think that
looks like a discrimination claim and I think those damages are
not going to be excludable. However, a § 1983 claim of
excessive force strikes me as fundamentally different, involving
as it does, tangible physical injury.
Finally, what about punitive damages under Schleier? I suspect
that punitive damages would not be excludable from gross
income as the Fourth, 63 Fifth, 64 the Ninth, 65 the Tenth 66 and

59. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
60. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989);
Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
63. See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990)
(stating that punitive damages were not excludable from gross income because
they did not serve the statutory purpose of "mak[ing] the taxpayer whole from
a previous loss of personal rights . . ").
64. See Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995);
Robinson v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995); Wesson v. United
States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Federal Circuit67 have held. Only the Sixth Circuit has treated
punitive damages as excludable. 68 There is an added
complication, one not even discussed in Schleier, and that is in
1989, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to state that
§ 104(a)(2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection
with a case not involving a physical injury or physical sickness.
Presumably, that means if the punitive damages are ordered in a

case involving personal injury or a physical injury or physical
sickness, they would be excludable. That was not even discussed
in Schleier. In some way, it seems to fly in the face of Schleier,
but that certainly would have to be taken into account.
I leave you with one final thought. Once you determine
whether or not the award is taxable, what, if anything, do you
say to the jury about that? If you decide that the award is not
taxable, should the jury be told that? There is considerable
authority - and if anyone is interested in it, I will be glad to
supply it after the lecture - that juries should be told, that juries
are so tax conscious that if you do not tell them, they will inflate
the award on that basis, so a cautionary instruction should be
given. 69 Thank you very much for your attention.

65. See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Roemer
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 1995 WL 761615, Nos. 95-966, 95-977 (Mar. 25, 1996).
67. See Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
68. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994). In

reaching its decision on this point, the court reasoned that the proposition
"[t]hat money damages make the injured person whole is merely a legal
fiction." Id. at 632. The court, therefore, "follow[ed] the directive of the
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit" and focused upon "the nature of the
claim underlying [the taxpayer's] damages award." Id. at 630. Accordingly.
the court found the taxpayers "damages - both compensatory and punitive -were received 'on account of' their personal injuries..." and, consequently,
were excluded from gross income. Id.
69. See, e.g., Domeracki v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245
(3d Cir. 1971); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980)
(FELA); In re Air Crash, 803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Kennett v.
Delta Air Lines, 560 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977); Vachstein v. Slocum, 625
A.2d 527 (N.J. App. Div. 1993).
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